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Fair and reasonable election systems
Author(s) -
Levenglick Arthur
Publication year - 1975
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830200105
Subject(s) - arrow , social choice theory , set (abstract data type) , field (mathematics) , computer science , law and economics , public economics , positive economics , mathematical economics , economics , mathematics , pure mathematics , programming language
A major problem in social choice theory has been to determine “fair” and “reasonable” criteria for election systems. Important advances in the field have been made by May (1952), Fishburn, and Young (1973), who have been able to characterize certain election systems through such criteria. Arrow (1963), on the other hand, has demonstrated an inconsistent set of criteria for decision systems. This paper explores some fair and reasonable conditions for decision systems, and, in the case of three alternatives, provides a provides a characterization.