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Information processing complexity and gaming behavior: The prisoner's dilemma
Author(s) -
Nydegger Rudy V.
Publication year - 1974
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830190306
Subject(s) - dilemma , situational ethics , personality , prisoner's dilemma , information processing , variable (mathematics) , psychology , stochastic game , affect (linguistics) , variables , social psychology , categorical variable , face (sociological concept) , computer science , cognitive psychology , microeconomics , mathematics , communication , economics , machine learning , sociology , social science , geometry , mathematical analysis
The interpretation of prisoner's dilemma (PD) research is often difficult due to conflicting and/or mixed results. In examining variables other than the payoff matrices, two lines of research have emerged: studying personality variables as they affect play and examining the effects of various situational variables such as seating arrangement or availability of communication. The present study contends that since the manipulation of situational variables in effect alters the information each S has about the game, the other player or both, then a relevant organismic variable might well be the information processing characteristics of the players. To examine this possibility 36 pairs of male S s played a 60‐trial iterative PD in one of two conditions: face‐to‐face; or in separate rooms. Half of the S s were abstract information processors (AIP), and half were concrete (CIP). S pairs were formed on the basis of the level of information processing complexity (LIP) of the members. These pairs were then assigned to one of three conditions which were based upon the LIP of the S s. The resultant groups were: AIP‐AIP, AIP‐CIP, and CIP‐CIP. It was predicted that LIP and information available about the other S would be nonindependent with respect to cooperation, defections, and money won. The results supported the hypothesis for cooperation and defection, but not for the money won. An examination of the interaction of the independent variables suggested that AIPs and CIPs approach this task differently, and develop their strategies from different types of information.