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Simple voting systems and majority rule
Author(s) -
Fishburn Peter C.
Publication year - 1974
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830190303
Subject(s) - simple (philosophy) , ballot , voting , majority rule , ranking (information retrieval) , preference , anti plurality voting , ideal (ethics) , cardinal voting systems , approval voting , mathematical economics , condorcet method , computer science , bullet voting , econometrics , mathematics , statistics , artificial intelligence , political science , law , epistemology , politics , philosophy
Abstract This paper investigates the degree to which single ballot weighted voting procedures for multiple alternative elections select the simple majority alternative when it exists. Emphasis is placed on procedures which are easiest for voters to respond to, namely those which ask the voter to indicate, with or without ranking, his most preferred alternatives. A simulation based on randomly generated preference orders is used to estimate agreement between the weighted rules and majority rule. The results obtained may provide useful input to the design of voting systems in situations where majority rule is felt to be a desirable ideal but where practical considerations weigh against a system which attempts to determine whether there is a simple majority alternative and, if so, which alternative it is.