Premium
Responsiveness in two‐person zero‐sum games
Author(s) -
Kahan James P.,
Goehring Dwight J.
Publication year - 1973
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830180105
Subject(s) - zero (linguistics) , minimax , adversary , zero sum game , psychology , exploit , fictitious play , social psychology , mathematics , mathematical economics , game theory , cognitive psychology , computer science , statistics , computer security , linguistics , philosophy
Thirty‐six subjects participated in two‐person zero‐sum games played against an experimenter in an examination of the effect of different types of game matrices and different mixed strategies on behavior. Results showed that when the opponent played nonoptimally, subjects were able to detect this nonoptimality and to exploit it to their own benefit. When the opponent played according to the minimax prescription, subjects' performance was not optimal but was sufficiently and consistently close to it that arguments in terms of differences between perceived and objective probabilities provide an attractive explanation for the differences.