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Threats and organizational design
Author(s) -
Contini Bruno
Publication year - 1967
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830120603
Subject(s) - organizational architecture , process (computing) , organizational structure , organizational theory , collective bargaining , management science , business , microeconomics , computer science , process management , knowledge management , economics , management , labour economics , operating system
Organizational design is aimed primarily at insuring that the “collective” decisions taken by the different members of the organization possess certain “desirable” properties (coordination, mutual satisfaction, and so on). According to the Simon‐March‐Barnard theory an organization can be viewed as a coalition of participants with different goals; solutions to organizational problems are reached through a bargaining process in which all of them participate. If appropriate constraints on the bargaining process are provided by the organizational structure, the negotiated solutions will have some “desirable” properties that an unconstrained bargaining solution cannot guarantee. The method of analysis is along the lines of economic theory.