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A profit‐sharing interpretation of shapley value for N‐person games
Author(s) -
Eisenman Richard L.
Publication year - 1967
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830120506
Subject(s) - shapley value , mathematical economics , interpretation (philosophy) , class (philosophy) , value (mathematics) , set (abstract data type) , profit (economics) , mathematics , computer science , economics , microeconomics , game theory , artificial intelligence , statistics , programming language
Shapley value measures the relative strengths of players in the formation of coalitions. This article provides a new interpretation of Shapley value by reshuffling its mathematical formula. As a result, the concept of value is extended to a broader class of models of social action. Specifically, certain social structures are to be specified as allowable sets of player sets. Each player takes a share from each set to which he belongs and gives a share to each set which excludes him. In this approach, the original Shapley value arises when the allowable sets are the ones with the minimum number of partitions in which each player combination occurs at least once.