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An experimental analysis of some variables of minimax theory
Author(s) -
Brayer A. Richard
Publication year - 1964
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830090106
Subject(s) - minimax , game theory , set (abstract data type) , adversary , affect (linguistics) , value (mathematics) , mathematical economics , strategy , computer science , psychology , economics , computer security , communication , machine learning , programming language
Game theory is not descriptive. It prescribes strategies for achieving particular goals within a particular set of rules. But it makes no statements about the strategies which people actually use in playing these games, whether their strategies conform to those suggested by the game‐theoretical model, or what factors other than the rules of the game may affect a player's strategy. While the application of game theory to the study of psychological, sociological, and political processes has increased in recent years, there have been relatively few descriptive studies of the variables and conditions affecting people's choices of strategy in various game situations. This paper investigates the effects of an opponent's strategy, expectation of an opponent's strategy, and the value of the game on subjects' choices in a series of 2‐person, 3 × 3, zero‐sum, strictly‐determined games.