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Measurement of social power, opportunity costs, and the theory of two‐person bargaining games
Author(s) -
Harsanyi John C.
Publication year - 1962
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830070105
Subject(s) - power (physics) , incentive , measure (data warehouse) , microeconomics , economics , bargaining power , game theory , compliance (psychology) , business , computer science , social psychology , psychology , physics , quantum mechanics , database
Several authors have recently suggested measuring social power in terms of its effects; that is, in terms of the changes that A can cause in B's behavior. This paper argues that an adequate measure of power must also contain information on the two parties' opportunity costs—the costs to A of acquiring or using his power over B , which the paper calls the costs of A 's power; and the costs to B of noncompliance, which measure the strength of B 's incentives to compliance, and which the paper calls the strength of A 's power over B . For bilateral power situations, where both parties can exert pressure on each other, a somewhat different game‐theoretical measure for the strength of A 's power is developed.