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Simple games: An outline of the descriptive theory
Author(s) -
Shapley L. S.
Publication year - 1962
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830070104
Subject(s) - simple (philosophy) , power (physics) , game theory , stochastic game , computer science , political science , mathematical economics , law and economics , operations research , management science , sociology , epistemology , economics , mathematics , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics
In parliamentary bodies coalitions turn out to be either all‐powerful or ineffectual. Conflicts which have such outcomes have been called simple games. This paper outlines their theoretical structure, sketching out their application to the United States Congress, the United Nations Security Council, or any other such body in which the acquisition of power is the payoff.