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The logical nature of an action scheme
Author(s) -
Kochen Manfred,
Levy Marion J.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830010403
Subject(s) - action (physics) , epistemology , natural (archaeology) , behavioural sciences , natural science , sociology , computer science , cognitive science , scheme (mathematics) , psychology , social science , mathematics , philosophy , physics , mathematical analysis , archaeology , quantum mechanics , history
A chronic concern of the behavioral scientist is how to build a system of definitions for the terms he uses so that when two or more behavioral scientists talk, they can be sure they understand each other. Consequently, much of theoretical social science has been little more than an effort to come to terms, to agree how the concepts of social science are to be abstracted and to what observables they are to refer. “Action” has been one of the central concepts whose sphere of definition various social scientists have tried to circumscribe. The authors examine some of the attempts and propose their own, which, they hope, will result in the emergence of concepts sufficiently precise to allow the development of behavioral science along the lines of inductive‐deductive method which has been so successful in natural science.