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A game theoretic analysis of congressional power distributions for a stable two‐party system
Author(s) -
Luce R. Duncan,
Rogow Arnold A.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830010202
Subject(s) - veto , referent , legislature , power (physics) , mathematical economics , game theory , politics , computer science , law and economics , political science , law , sociology , mathematics , philosophy , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics
Attempts to make behavioral science a science often hinge on making vague terms precise or quantifiable, if possible. From game theory comes a definition of “power” (as applied to coalitions) in precise and quantifiable form. Once one has a quantitative definition of power, one wonders how this quantity will be distributed in a body of men with partially the same and partially opposite interests and under the influence of various other considerations. It is assumed here that the American legislative apparatus (involving both Congress and the President) is such a body. The picture is necessarily a drastically simplified one, but it has some essential and recognizable features of its referent: majority rule, the veto, the overriding of the veto, the two‐party system, the defections of some members from one party to the other, the “die hards” who never defect. The results of rigorous analysis are in general in agreement with the “findings” of the political scientists about where the power resides under various conditions. But in addition this game‐theoretical approach calls attention to other results, which are not often emphasized or realized. The method thus provides a framework for future enrichment and refinement of exact methods in political science.