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Gangarten des Rationalen. Zu den Zeitstrukturen der Quantenrevolution
Author(s) -
Stöltzner Michael
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
berichte zur wissenschaftsgeschichte
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.109
H-Index - 8
eISSN - 1522-2365
pISSN - 0170-6233
DOI - 10.1002/bewi.200901357
Subject(s) - epistemology , empiricism , philosophy , scientific revolution , rationality , history of science , order (exchange) , convention , historiography , sociology , history , social science , archaeology , finance , economics
Abstract Paces of Rationality in the History of Science: On the Temporal Structures of the Quantum Revolution. I argue that the Kuhnian picture of scientific revolutions must be modified by introducing various levels of historical reality (or historiographical reconstruction) and reference points for rational justification in order to permit the constant movement back and forth between long shots and close‐ups that is indispensable in the history of science. Such an account makes it possible to describe a scientific revolution not as a simultaneous break on all levels, but as a sequence of ruptures on different levels, in which some levels allow the formulation of the new points of view or a justification of the transition. The proposed account appears reconcilable both with Michael Friedman's recent philosophical analysis of the dynamics of reason, even though it also admits of social and technological levels that are not representing a constitutive a priori, and Michel Foucault's archeology of nature, which does not contradict the fact that in studying the history of physical theory one typically finds precisely formulated and well‐separated levels of knowledge. It is ironic that Kuhn's original account, which helped to shape the ‘new epistemology’, is still largely indebted to the Logical Empiricists' conception of a single linguistic framework, the establishment of which is merely a matter of convention and pragmatics. At the example of Mara Beller's assessment of the quantum revolution. I argue that the Kuhnian picture represents an obstacle against assessing one particular trait of the German physics of the 1920s, the important formative part played by philosophical convictions of the German physicist‐philosophers.