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Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game
Author(s) -
Chaudhuri Ananish,
Ali Khan Sarah,
Lakshmiratan Aishwarya,
Py AnneLaure,
Shah Lisa
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
journal of behavioral decision making
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.136
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1099-0771
pISSN - 0894-3257
DOI - 10.1002/bdm.449
Subject(s) - trustworthiness , dictator game , reciprocal , stochastic game , outcome (game theory) , social psychology , psychology , reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , microeconomics , economics , linguistics , philosophy
We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.