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The influence of reasons on interpretations of probability forecasts
Author(s) -
Flugstad Annette R.,
Windschitl Paul D.
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
journal of behavioral decision making
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.136
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1099-0771
pISSN - 0894-3257
DOI - 10.1002/bdm.437
Subject(s) - event (particle physics) , pessimism , argument (complex analysis) , econometrics , frequentist probability , interpretation (philosophy) , probability estimation , psychology , statistics , actuarial science , computer science , economics , mathematics , artificial intelligence , epistemology , medicine , bayesian probability , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , programming language
Abstract When providing a probability estimate for an event, experts often supply reasons that they expect will clarify and support that estimate. We investigated the possible unintended influence that these reasons might have on a listener's intuitive interpretation of the event's likelihood. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that people who read positive reasons for a doctor's probability estimate regarding a hypothetical surgery were more optimistic than those who read negative reasons for the identical estimate. Experiment 3 tested whether a doctor's failure forecast for a surgery would result in differing levels of pessimism when the potential risk was attributed to one complication that had a probability of 0.30 versus three complications that had a disjunctive probability of 0.30. Overall, the findings are consistent with the argument that a probability estimate, albeit numerically precise, can be flexibly interpreted at an intuitive level depending on the reasons that the forecaster provides as the basis for the estimate. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.