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Provision of step‐level public goods with continuous contribution
Author(s) -
Suleiman Ramzi,
Rapoport Am
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
journal of behavioral decision making
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.136
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1099-0771
pISSN - 0894-3257
DOI - 10.1002/bdm.3960050205
Subject(s) - endowment , public good , maximization , microeconomics , economics , utility maximization , test (biology) , class (philosophy) , group (periodic table) , public goods game , social dilemma , social psychology , psychology , mathematical economics , computer science , political science , law , paleontology , chemistry , organic chemistry , artificial intelligence , biology
Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco‐operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show that the level of contribution depends on the provision threshold, and that it increases when contributions are not restricted to be all‐or‐none. We present, discuss, and competitively test two models for this class of social dilemmas, one postulating maximization of expected utility and the other yielding an equitable solution.