Premium
Additional tests of utility theory under unique and repeated conditions
Author(s) -
Keren Gideon
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
journal of behavioral decision making
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.136
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1099-0771
pISSN - 0894-3257
DOI - 10.1002/bdm.3960040407
Subject(s) - independence (probability theory) , econometrics , empirical research , psychology , cognitive psychology , positive economics , epistemology , economics , statistics , mathematics , philosophy
A fundamental postulate of utility theory is its independence of long‐run considerations. Consequently, unique and repeated gambles are supposed to be treated alike. Recent empirical studies (e.g. Keren and Wagenaar, 1987; Montgomery and Adelbratt, 1982; Wedell and Bockenholt, 1989) cast doubt on the descriptive adequacy of this assumption. Additional empirical evidence is presented, supporting the claim that people exhibit different patterns of choice under unique and repeated gambles. Potential explanations for these findings are briefly discussed.