Open AccessInternational Institutions and the Rise of A sia
Author(s) -
Drysdale Peter,
Willis Sébastien
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
asia and the pacific policy studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.529
H-Index - 14
ISSN - 2050-2680
DOI - 10.1002/app5.47
Subject(s) - economics , welfare , element (criminal law) , set (abstract data type) , repeated game , world trade , international trade , game theory , international economics , microeconomics , market economy , political science , law , computer science , programming language
This article applies a game‐theoretical analysis of institutions to the international institutional architecture, of which the G 20 is treated as a central element. The article argues that international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund are best understood as mechanisms for coordinating and supporting equilibria in repeated games played among policy‐makers in the world's largest economies. The growth of the emerging economies, particularly in A sia, has altered these games, and there is no guarantee, with these new entrants and new issues that have emerged, that the old equilibrium strategies are still viable. The G 20, it is argued, is best understood as an attempt to respond to this change and coordinate play on a new set of globally welfare‐enhancing equilibria in these games.