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A decade of theory of mind research on cayo santiago: Insights into rhesus macaque social cognition
Author(s) -
Drayton Lindsey A.,
Santos Laurie R.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
american journal of primatology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.988
H-Index - 81
eISSN - 1098-2345
pISSN - 0275-2565
DOI - 10.1002/ajp.22362
Subject(s) - theory of mind , macaque , rhesus macaque , cognition , primatology , psychology , non human , social cognition , primate , comparative psychology , social psychology , epistemology , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , sociology , anthropology , biology , neuroscience , philosophy , immunology
Over the past several decades, researchers have become increasingly interested in understanding how primates understand the behavior of others. One open question concerns whether nonhuman primates think about others’ behavior in psychological terms, that is, whether they have a theory of mind. Over the last ten years, experiments conducted on the free‐ranging rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta ) living on Cayo Santiago have provided important insights into this question. In this review, we highlight what we think are some of the most exciting results of this body of work. Specifically we describe experiments suggesting that rhesus monkeys may understand some psychological states, such as what others see, hear, and know, but that they fail to demonstrate an understanding of others’ beliefs. Thus, while some aspects of theory of mind may be shared between humans and other primates, others capacities are likely to be uniquely human. We also discuss some of the broader debates surrounding comparative theory of mind research, as well as what we think may be productive lines for future research with the rhesus macaques of Cayo Santiago. Am. J. Primatol. 78:106–116, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.