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Do U.S. marketing orders have much market power? An examination of the Almond Board of California
Author(s) -
Crespi John M.,
ChacónCascante Adriana
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
agribusiness
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.57
H-Index - 43
eISSN - 1520-6297
pISSN - 0742-4477
DOI - 10.1002/agr.10081
Subject(s) - econlit , cartel , profit (economics) , market power , agribusiness , marketing , order (exchange) , scope (computer science) , business , economics , industrial organization , collusion , microeconomics , political science , finance , agriculture , law , ecology , programming language , medline , computer science , monopoly , biology
This review tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit‐maximizing cartels. It analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry and the authority granted to a board of producers by the almond marketing order would seem to be conducive to profit‐maximizing cartel behavior. Nevertheless, the authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California is significantly less than would be expected from a profit‐maximizing cartel. [EconLit citations: L120, L430]. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 20: 1–15, 2004.