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The effect of source credibility on bullshit receptivity
Author(s) -
Ilić Sandra,
Damnjanović Kaja
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
applied cognitive psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.719
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1099-0720
pISSN - 0888-4080
DOI - 10.1002/acp.3852
Subject(s) - credibility , psychology , correctness , receptivity , statement (logic) , cognition , reflection (computer programming) , epistemology , social psychology , cognitive psychology , computer science , philosophy , algorithm , neuroscience , programming language
Summary Pseudo‐profound bullshit pertains to grammatically and syntactically correct but meaningless sentences, that, due to syntactical correctness appear as made to communicate something and research shows that people deem them profound. However, the effect of differing source credibility on bullshit profoundness evaluations has, to our knowledge, not yet been tested. We presented participants with pseudo‐profound bullshit alone and with authors of different credibility. In order to partly replicate and extend on the findings regarding mechanisms of receptivity and sensitivity to bullshit we collected profoundness evaluations for mundane statements and proverbs, and different measures of analytic thinking. Ascribing credible authors leads to an increase while ascribing uncredible authors leads to a decrease in profoundness evaluations. Cognitive reflection protects against the tendency to evaluate any type of statement as profound and drives better differentiation between pseudo‐ and conventionally truly profound, while positive views about actively open‐minded thinking enable stronger effects of uncredible authorship.