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Registered report: The effects of incentivized lies on memory
Author(s) -
Riesthuis Paul,
Otgaar Henry,
Hope Lorraine,
Mangiulli Ivan
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
applied cognitive psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.719
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1099-0720
pISSN - 0888-4080
DOI - 10.1002/acp.3838
Subject(s) - incentive , outcome (game theory) , psychology , recall , social psychology , event (particle physics) , cheating , cognitive psychology , economics , microeconomics , physics , quantum mechanics
The proposed experiment will examine the effect of deceptive behavior on memory. Participants will be assigned to a “strong‐incentive to cheat” or “weak‐incentive to cheat” condition and play the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die‐Rolling paradigm. Specifically, Player A (computer; participants think it is another participant) throws a die and reports it to Player B (participant). Then Player B throws his/her die, remembers the outcome, and reports it to Player A. Participants in the “strong‐incentive to cheat” condition are monetarily punished if their die roll outcome differs from Player A's die roll outcome. Participants in the “weak‐incentive to cheat” condition are not punished if the die roll outcomes differ. Two‐days later, memory for the die‐rolling event will be assessed. We predict that participants in the “strong‐incentive to cheat” condition will have lower belief and recollection for the die‐rolling event and will report more errors than participants in the “weak‐incentive to cheat” condition.