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Remembering pragmatic inferences
Author(s) -
Chan Jason C. K.,
McDermott Kathleen B.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
applied cognitive psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.719
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1099-0720
pISSN - 0888-4080
DOI - 10.1002/acp.1215
Subject(s) - psychology , inference , false memory , statement (logic) , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , epistemology , recall , philosophy
After hearing that ‘the flimsy shelf weakened under the weight of the books,’ people often remember having heard that the shelf broke–an inference that is not logically necessitated by the statement. Indeed, when asked to choose which word was heard— weakened or broke —people often mistakenly choose broke , a pragmatic inference, as having been heard (McDermott & Chan, 2006). On what basis are these decisions made? The present study explored the subjective experience accompanying memory for pragmatic inferences with remember/know/guess classifications (Gardiner & Java, 1991; Tulving, 1985). The phenomenological experiences accompanying such false memories were indistinguishable from those of true memories. The dual process signal detection account proposed by Wixted and Stretch (2004) provides a framework for understanding our results. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.