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Crisis stability games
Author(s) -
Bracken Jerome,
Shubik Martin
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
naval research logistics (nrl)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.665
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1520-6750
pISSN - 0894-069X
DOI - 10.1002/1520-6750(199304)40:3<289::aid-nav3220400302>3.0.co;2-h
Subject(s) - preemption , context (archaeology) , incentive , mathematical economics , stability (learning theory) , game theory , computer science , operations research , economics , microeconomics , mathematics , history , archaeology , machine learning , operating system
This article investigates the problem of crisis stability in the context of conventional and nuclear warfare, with emphasis on the incentives for one or both sides to engage in a preemptive nuclear strike. The approach is to offer two enriched versions of a recently developed model of escalation, to solve the models, and to observe that game‐theoretic solutions can change from nonpreemption to preemption, depending upon the specific game structure and upon the values of the parameters describing the outcomes. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.