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Wittgenstein on Köhler and Gestalt psychology: A critique
Author(s) -
Pastore Nicholas
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
journal of the history of the behavioral sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.216
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1520-6696
pISSN - 0022-5061
DOI - 10.1002/1520-6696(199110)27:4<341::aid-jhbs2300270403>3.0.co;2-g
Subject(s) - gestalt psychology , dualism , perception , superordinate goals , psychology , epistemology , physicalism , sensory system , focus (optics) , content (measure theory) , cognitive psychology , cognitive science , philosophy , social psychology , metaphysics , mathematics , mathematical analysis , physics , optics
Wittgenstein's objections to Kohler and gestalt psychology are critically examined. Principal features of Kohler's Gestalt Psychology are discussed that are relevant to Wittgenstein's views. They include Köhler's concepts of “subjective” and “objective” experiences, “sensory organization,” and “empiristic theory.” Wittgenstein's objections, which focus on the concept of sensory organization , are examined. Wittgenstein employs the term “aspect,” which is derived from the findings of gestalt psychology, as a replacement for Köhler's term “sensory organization.” After tracing his uses of aspect , it is shown that aspect is a superordinate entity distinct from ‘sensory content’ (colors and shapes). This dualism of aspect and sensory content is of the same kind that prevailed in the empiristic theory of visual perception. Wittgenstein's adherence to the empiristic theory is discussed. Finally, the difference between Wittgenstein's aspect and Köhler's sensory organization is examined.