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Durkheim's sociology of scientific knowledge
Author(s) -
Gieryn Thomas F.
Publication year - 1982
Publication title -
journal of the history of the behavioral sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.216
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1520-6696
pISSN - 0022-5061
DOI - 10.1002/1520-6696(198204)18:2<107::aid-jhbs2300180202>3.0.co;2-k
Subject(s) - epistemology , positivism , relativism , sociology , sociology of scientific knowledge , social knowledge , cultural relativism , social reality , sociology of knowledge , sociology of culture , social science , philosophy , law , political science , human rights
Durkheim's thinking on scientific knowledge reveals several contradictions, resulting from the relativist implications of his substantive theory of culture and the positivist assumptions of his metatheoretical definition of scientific methods in sociology. In his explanations of historical and cross‐cultural differences in „truthful” representations of reality, Durkheim suggests that logical and conceptual structures of knowledge are determined by social morphology, and that the validity of any truth‐claim is limited to cultural contexts in which designated criteria of validation are normatively maintained. However, in epistemological works such as The Rules , Durkheim suggests that social factors are of little importance in constructing scientific knowledge, and that truths of science mirror external reality and so their validity transcends cultural boundaries.