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Psychology, progress, and the problem of reflexivity: A study in the epistemological foundations of psychology
Author(s) -
Flanagan Owen J.
Publication year - 1981
Publication title -
journal of the history of the behavioral sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.216
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1520-6696
pISSN - 0022-5061
DOI - 10.1002/1520-6696(198107)17:3<375::aid-jhbs2300170308>3.0.co;2-u
Subject(s) - reflexivity , psychology , epistemology , alternation (linguistics) , theoretical psychology , quality (philosophy) , psychological research , social psychology , cognitive psychology , sociology , social science , philosophy , linguistics
Buss's thesis that, throughout the history of psychology, psychological theories have alternated between two contradictory models of human nature is examined and supported. One model sees humans as actively constructing themselves; the other model sees humans as constructed from the outside. The thesis that the inherent reflexive quality of psychological inquiry is the cause of this alternation is then examined. Three different hypotheses as to how “reflexivity” might explain this alternation are offered. Finally, brief attention is given to the question of whether psychology can be seen as progressing if it is as philosophically indecisive as the analysis suggests.