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Durkheim, realism, and Rousseau
Author(s) -
Jones Robert Alun
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
journal of the history of the behavioral sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.216
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1520-6696
pISSN - 0022-5061
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1520-6696(199610)32:4<330::aid-jhbs2>3.0.co;2-v
Subject(s) - realism , sociology , politics , philosophy , epistemology , humanities , law , political science
In Emile (1762), Rousseau advocated a kind of “negative” education, free from books, abstract concepts, and the tyranny of human wills, so that the child learned in accordance with his own nature and the “heavy yoke of necessity” imposed by the dependence on real, concrete things. In Les Règles de la méthode sociologique (1895), Durkheim insisted that sociological method rests entirely on one principle—i.e., “que les faits sociaux doivent être étudiés comme des choses.” This paper explores the historical relationship between the educational realism epitomized in the first book and the social realism epitomized in the second. Focusing on Durkheim's lecture notes on both the Contrat social (1918) and Émile (1919), as well as L'Éducation morale (1925) and L'Évolution pédagogique en France (1938), I lend empirical support to Sheldon Wolin's claim that Durkheim has been the medium by which Rousseau has left his mark on modern social science. I also place Durkheim's realism—both social and educational—within the larger context of his political commitment to the Third French Republic. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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