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Health insurance coverage of the unemployed: COBRA and the potential effects of Kassebaum‐Kennedy
Author(s) -
Berger Mark C.,
Black Dan A.,
Scott Frank A.,
Chandra Amitabh
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
journal of policy analysis and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.898
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1520-6688
pISSN - 0276-8739
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1520-6688(199922)18:3<430::aid-pam7>3.0.co;2-b
Subject(s) - cobra , actuarial science , unemployment , business , economics , demographic economics , computer science , economic growth , programming language
We use the April 1993 Current Population Survey to examine the health insurance coverage decisions of the unemployed and to simulate the potential effects of the new Kassebaum‐Kennedy legislation. After controlling for demographic characteristics, COBRA eligibility raises the probability of health insurance coverage by 0.095, while eligibility for spouse employer insurance increases the likelihood of coverage by 0.318, and eligibility for both increases the likelihood of coverage by 0.341. In our simulations, we find that had Kassebaum‐Kennedy been in effect in April 1993, 9.0 percent of the unemployed would be eligible to take up coverage, and the coverage rate of the unemployed would have been increased by 0.85 percent to 1.5 percent from 41.6 percent. Our estimates of the effect of Kassebaum‐Kennedy on health insurance coverage are much lower than those reported by the Government Accounting Office prior to the passage of the legislation. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

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