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THE REGULATION OF GENERAL PRACTICE IN THE UK
Author(s) -
BARTLETT WILL
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
the international journal of health planning and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.672
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1099-1751
pISSN - 0749-6753
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-1751(199601)11:1<3::aid-hpm411>3.0.co;2-n
Subject(s) - incentive , business , scope (computer science) , autonomy , deregulation , context (archaeology) , health care , private sector , public economics , public relations , economics , economic growth , political science , market economy , paleontology , computer science , law , biology , programming language
When health professionals offer primary health services on a private market a number of problems can arise to do with choice, quality and supplier‐induced demand. Professional self‐regulation through qualification requirements and licensing procedures may offset some of the worst problems. However, in the UK, the primary health care sector is also subject to additional regulatory controls set within the context of the NHS. Private practitioners within the NHS function in a quasi‐market setting, in which they are funded by public health authorities to provide services free at the point of delivery to their patients. Within this context there is regulation of quality, entry, prices and profits. This system can be contrasted with the much less extensive set of regulations applied to more market‐based systems operating in countries such as the USA. Recent reforms in the UK have, however, initiated a movement towards a market‐led system, extended the autonomy of health care practitioners, and increased the scope of financial incentives as a mechanism to promote professional quality and innovation. This article draws on the insights developed in Propper (1993) in her study of regulation and quasi‐markets in secondary health care, education and community care. Its focus is on the extent of regulation in primary health care services; the effects of increased financial incentives on professional performance brought about by the NHS reforms; and, the scope for further deregulation of professional services in primary care.