Premium
Control and Game‐Theoretical Treatment of a Cost‐Security Model for Disarmament
Author(s) -
Jathe M.,
Krabs W.,
Scheffran J.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
mathematical methods in the applied sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.719
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1099-1476
pISSN - 0170-4214
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-1476(19970525)20:8<653::aid-mma857>3.0.co;2-d
Subject(s) - disarmament , mathematics , control (management) , mathematical economics , mathematical optimization , arms control , calculus (dental) , operations research , computer science , artificial intelligence , medicine , political science , law , dentistry
In this paper a time‐discrete dynamic model for the process of disarmament is investigated. The state variables of the system are costs and security values. We assume that the costs can be controlled, and we aim at reducing the costs to zero and achieving non‐negative security values after a finite number of time steps. In the case where the opponents behave cooperatively this leads to the solution of a linear programming problem. If the opponents behave non‐cooperatively, then a Nash equilibrium has to be determined under linear constraints. © 1997 by B. G. Teubner Stuttgart–John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Math. Meth. Appl. Sci. , Vol. 20, 653–666 (1997).