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Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures
Author(s) -
Greenlee Patrick,
Cassiman Bruno
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199905)20:3<115::aid-mde927>3.0.co;2-v
Subject(s) - collusion , industrial organization , profit (economics) , microeconomics , joint venture , new product development , joint (building) , product (mathematics) , competition (biology) , business , economics , product market , commerce , marketing , mathematics , architectural engineering , ecology , geometry , incentive , engineering , biology
In this paper we extend the existing literature on research and development (R&D) investments and research joint ventures (RJVs) in two important ways. First, we analyze and compare the case where firms collude in the product market to the benchmark case of competition in the output market. Second, we allow firms to form coalitions endogenously as a separate stage in the game. We develop profit functions that depend on the partition of firms into joint ventures and the nature of product competition between venture partners. Our results illustrate the restrictive nature of some assumptions made in the literature. Typically multiple RJVs of different sizes form in equilibrium. In general, RJVs should not be promoted if they entail product market collusion. Given the information available to policy‐makers, it is unlikely that an R&D policy more refined than analyzing and allowing RJVs on a case‐by‐case basis is feasible. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.