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Author(s)
Yi SangSeung
Publication year1998
Publication title
managerial and decision economics
Resource typeJournals
PublisherJohn Wiley & Sons
Abstract This paper examines the optimal licensing policy of a patent holder when potential licensees differ in their capacities in absorbing the patented technology. If two‐part tariffs with non‐negative royalties and fixed fees are feasible, the patent holder finds it optimal to license the strong firm exclusively whether or not an exclusive licensing of the weak firm deters the strong firm from entering the market. Hence, the potential trade‐offs between strategic gains associated with licensing to weak competitors and efficiency gains associated with licensing to efficient competitors do not exist when two part tariffs are available. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Subject(s)business , competitor analysis , computer science , economics , industrial organization , license , marketing , microeconomics , monetary economics , operating system
Language(s)English
SCImago Journal Rank0.288
H-Index51
eISSN1099-1468
pISSN0143-6570
DOI10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199805)19:3<189::aid-mde879>3.0.co;2-g

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