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EPA enforcement, firm response strategies, and stockholder wealth: an empirical examination
Author(s) -
Bosch J.C.,
Eckard E. Woodrow,
Lee Insup
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199805)19:3<167::aid-mde882>3.0.co;2-7
Subject(s) - shareholder , competitor analysis , contest , enforcement , business , competition (biology) , control (management) , value (mathematics) , industrial organization , economics , microeconomics , monetary economics , finance , marketing , corporate governance , political science , law , ecology , management , machine learning , computer science , biology
We investigate the effect of EPA pollution control enforcement activities and firm response strategies on stockholders' wealth. We find that the market reacts negatively upon learning that the firm has been targeted, and that losing a contest with the EPA is very costly to stockholders. Apparently firms are not expected to recover a significant part of pollution control costs from their customers. Somewhat surprisingly, losses are only weakly related to the presence of (unregulated) foreign competition, suggesting that untargeted domestic competitors may restrain cost recovery. Our analysis also indicates that firms may benefit by cooperating with the EPA; i.e., compliant strategies reduce (but don't avoid) wealth losses. The losses of firms that settle are about 40% less than those of firms that fight and lose, and we find no evidence of value gains for firms that fight and win. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.