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Why justice matters in compensation decision making
Author(s) -
Scarpello Vida,
Jones Foard F.
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
journal of organizational behavior
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.938
H-Index - 177
eISSN - 1099-1379
pISSN - 0894-3796
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-1379(199605)17:3<285::aid-job750>3.0.co;2-0
Subject(s) - seniority , agency (philosophy) , economic justice , organizational justice , compensation (psychology) , social psychology , principal–agent problem , sample (material) , procedural justice , differential (mechanical device) , stakeholder , perception , psychology , business , public relations , sociology , political science , economics , management , law , organizational commitment , social science , corporate governance , chemistry , engineering , chromatography , neuroscience , aerospace engineering
Using agency theory and the stakeholder fairness concept as the conceptual base, this study confirmed three agency theory hypotheses about differential relationships between four sets of pay procedures and evaluations of pay, supervision and the employing organization. Education and seniority related variables were also found to moderate the relationships between procedural justice perceptions and evaluations of supervision and the employing organization. The study used a stratified random sample of 612 occupationally heterogeneous employees of a large County government in South Eastern United States. Results suggest that agency theory provides a parsimonious explanation for why justice matters in compensation decision making.