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Rational inefficient compromises in negotiation
Author(s) -
Kersten Gregory E.,
Mallory Geoff R.
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
journal of multi‐criteria decision analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.462
H-Index - 47
eISSN - 1099-1360
pISSN - 1057-9214
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-1360(199903)8:2<106::aid-mcda243>3.0.co;2-7
Subject(s) - negotiation , fallacy , sociology , international business , management , media studies , library science , operations research , engineering , computer science , social science , philosophy , economics , linguistics
It has often been assumed that rational negotiators who achieve inefficient compromises should accept Pareto improvements suggested by some external party, such as an expert mediator, or a computer system. Following this assumption an argument is made to give legitimacy to efficient compromises generated by a negotiation support system or to entice a partymove to a Pareto improvement. The simplificatons made in model construction on the one hand and the very narrow and limited considerations of rationality in present negotiation support systems on the other, suggest a different approach to support. This approach is based on engaging users to a sound process confronting them with their inconsisencies rather than providing solutions or promoting improvements.