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What does principled versus conventional moral reasoning convey to others about the politics and psychology of the reasoner?
Author(s) -
Emler Nicholas,
Stace Kerry
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
european journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.609
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1099-0992
pISSN - 0046-2772
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199906)29:4<455::aid-ejsp937>3.0.co;2-1
Subject(s) - lawrence kohlberg's stages of moral development , moral reasoning , psychology , semantic reasoner , moral development , social cognitive theory of morality , social psychology , politics , moral psychology , internalism and externalism , moral disengagement , biology and political orientation , perception , cognition , epistemology , law , political science , philosophy , artificial intelligence , neuroscience , computer science
Abstract The well‐documented relationship between political orientation and moral reasoning has most often been interpreted in terms of the influence of level of moral development (cf. Kohlberg, 1984) upon an individual's political inclinations: those who have reached the conventional level (or stage 4) in Kohlberg's terms will as a result tend to favour the political right, whereas those who progress to the principled level (stage 5) shift their political preferences to the left. An alternative, ‘social communication’ view is that these different forms of moral reasoning are expressions of contrasting political identities, and differ in ideological content rather than developmental level. We compared the inferences that American and British students ( n =211) drew about the political, moral and cognitive attributes of a target who, in response to moral dilemmas, used either stage 4A, stage 4B or stage 5 moral arguments as defined by Kohlberg. Perception of the target's political attributes varied consistently and significantly as a function of the target's moral reasoning, but there were no corresponding effects on perception of moral or cognitive attributes. The results are interpreted as supporting a social communication view of moral reasoning and its relation to political orientation, and at the same time questioning the claim that conventional (stage 4) and principled (stage 5) moral reasoning are distinct levels of socio‐cognitive development. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.