Book review: Game theory and interdependence. Game Theory and its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences, Andrew M. Colman, Oxford: Butterworth‐Heinemann, 1995. 375 pp, ISBN 0‐7506‐2369‐1.

Several years ago, I asked an expert on decision making whether he could give an example of a decision that does not impact the wellbeing of others. After some period of silence, his response was: `Well, . . . eh, . . . yes, eh, . . . how about the decision what to wear on a particular day?' The extended response latency as well as the example itself illustrate that it is exceptionally dicult to think of decisions that do not have social or interpersonal consequences. Indeed, it is easy to imagine that a decision about what to wear has several direct or indirect social or interpersonal consequences (e.g. a partner may feel bad because of the lousy combination of colours). Andrew Colman's book entitled Game Theory and its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences is about decisions that a€ect one another's wellbeing. It is a book about Interdependence, one of the most pivotal concepts in the social and behavioral sciences, and a concept that receives increasing attention in the biological sciences as well. Indeed, the ®elds of game theory and interdependence are rapidly growing, not only in theoretical development but also in terms of its applications to a wide variety of topics. The book does an excellent job in outlining what game theory is and what it is not. Any theory can be evaluated in terms of two general criteria: (a) abstraction, a theory should o€er an abstract conceptual framework for describing speci®c phenomena, and (b) construction; a theory should integrate abstract concepts in meaningful ways so that it allows for novel predictions. The book describes that the utility of game theory derives not so much from construction; instead, its utility is deeply rooted in abstraction. Game theory provides a powerful conceptual tool (i.e. games) forouranalysis and comprehension of interdependence situations. It deals with the features of interdependence that help us understandwhat a given interdependence situation is about and what it calls for (e.g. coordination, cooperation, competition). In that sense, it is useful that Colman devotes chapters to noninterdependence (i.e. one-person games), to coordination games, zero-sum games, prisoner's dilemmas and related games, thereby providing a comprehensive game-theoretical framework for understanding each of these domains of interdependence. Also, this book convincingly demonstrates why the `extreme' forms of interdependence (i.e. coordination games and strictly competitive games) are important and worthy of empirical and theoretical investigation. Moreover, issues such as trembling hand equilibria, bargaining, and Axelrod's tournaments of the prisoner's dilemmas are well discussed in this book, thereby nicely complementing Colman's ®rst edition of this book, which was entitled Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction. Finally, I also believe that this book is successful in integrating game theory and extant interdependence theories which focus more strongly on the psychological underpinnings of interdependent decision making and which have been successfully served as a framework for issues varying from interpersonal relationships, cooperation and competition, prosocial behavior, and negotiation. The title of this second edition emphasizes `applications in the social and biological sciences'. The applications discussed by Colman focus on strategic voting, theory of evolution, and philosophical issues, illustrating how game theory can be used (a) to understand voting procedures (and why it is dicult to develop fair and ecient procedures), (b) to analyze the functional and evolutionary aspects of strategies such as Tit for Tat or Win±Stay±Lose±Change, and (c) to help clarify classical philosophical controversies focusing on issues such as morality and rationality. These `applications' are useful in that they provide the reader with broader frameworks that are relevant to various `mini-theories' and speci®c domains of research that are developed within speci®c disciplines. At the same time, by emphasizing `applications' in the title and elsewhere, most readers will also expect other types of applications, anticipating a thorough discussion of the manner in which game theory contributes to our understanding critical interpersonal, intergroup, or societal problems (e.g. destructive forms of interpersonal relationships, various forms of intergroup hostility, overpopulation, environmental pollution, energy conservation). Although the author uses many real-life examples as illustrations of particular game structures, there is relatively little attention to the analysis of real-life problems and how game theory and interdependencemight contribute to understanding and solving such problems. Also, the book could have devoted attention to some other theoretically and application-relevant topics, including research focusing on comparisons of individuals and groups (i.e. it tends to be exceedingly dicult to promote co-operation among groups) and research focusing on structural solutions to social dilemmas (e.g. how should social dilemmas be managed?). Given that it is `easy' to draw attention to issues that are not discussed, I should note that I was actually impressed by the large number of