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Accurate second guesses in misinformation studies
Author(s) -
Wright Daniel B.,
Varley Stella,
Belton Aine
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
applied cognitive psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.719
H-Index - 100
eISSN - 1099-0720
pISSN - 0888-4080
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1099-0720(199602)10:1<13::aid-acp356>3.0.co;2-l
Subject(s) - misinformation , psychology , suggestibility , cognitive psychology , false memory , cognition , subject (documents) , experimental psychology , social psychology , recall , computer science , computer security , neuroscience , library science
The reason why misleading post‐event information affects later recollections is the subject of a heated debate within cognitive psychology. One series of studies that is often cited is when subjects are allowed a second guess. Loftus (1979) found that the second guesses of errant misled subjects were not above chance levels. This, she argued, suggests that the memory for the original information cannot be accessed at testing. Four studies are reported in which subjects were allowed second guesses. In these studies errant misled subjects second guesses were better than chance. We discuss how these findings inform the debate about why misinformation affects memory.