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Empirical organizational‐level examinations of agency and collaborative predictions of performance‐contingent compensation
Author(s) -
Shaw Jason D.,
Gupta Nina,
Delery John E.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(200005)21:5<611::aid-smj106>3.0.co;2-u
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , compensation (psychology) , principal–agent problem , sample (material) , business , industrial organization , microeconomics , economics , marketing , management , psychology , sociology , social psychology , social science , corporate governance , chemistry , chromatography
Competitive predictions regarding the relationships between: (a) monitoring and agent tenure, and (b) performance‐contingent compensation are derived from agency theory and collaborative perspectives. These results are tested in a within‐industry (trucking) sample and in a cross‐industry sample. The results partially support both perspectives, particularly with respect to monitoring and agent tenure. Implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.