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Corporate political strategies and firm performance: indications of firm‐specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government
Author(s) -
Hillman Amy J.,
Zardkoohi Asghar,
Bierman Leonard
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199901)20:1<67::aid-smj22>3.0.co;2-t
Subject(s) - politics , variety (cybernetics) , government (linguistics) , transaction cost , business , service (business) , value (mathematics) , marketing , industrial organization , linkage (software) , public policy , database transaction , public economics , economics , finance , economic growth , political science , linguistics , philosophy , law , biochemistry , chemistry , artificial intelligence , machine learning , computer science , gene , programming language
Firms employ a variety of political strategies (e.g., lobbying, contributions) in an attempt to gain influence or access to the public policy process. A variety of benefits may accrue to firms that are successful in creating a linkage with the government: information, access, influence, reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, etc. However, the direct benefits of such strategies are difficult to observe. One political strategy is studied here—personal service (having a firm representative serve in a political capacity). Event‐study methodology results show that such linkages with the government positively affect firm value. These findings indicate that firm‐specific benefits may result from political strategies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.