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Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective
Author(s) -
Magnan Michael L.,
Stonge Sylvie
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199708)18:7<573::aid-smj900>3.0.co;2-k
Subject(s) - discretion , executive compensation , compensation (psychology) , context (archaeology) , business , accounting , perspective (graphical) , corporate governance , finance , psychology , political science , social psychology , computer science , law , paleontology , biology , artificial intelligence
This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry‐specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.