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BOARD STRUCTURE, ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS, AND STOCKHOLDER WEALTH
Author(s) -
SUNDARAMURTHY CHAMU,
MAHONEY JAMES M.,
MAHONEY JOSEPH T.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
strategic management journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 11.035
H-Index - 286
eISSN - 1097-0266
pISSN - 0143-2095
DOI - 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199703)18:3<231::aid-smj877>3.0.co;2-v
Subject(s) - shareholder , voting , sample (material) , business , economics , accounting , empirical evidence , representation (politics) , monetary economics , corporate governance , law , finance , political science , politics , philosophy , chemistry , chromatography , epistemology
Abstract This paper’s regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair‐price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti‐greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984–88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firms’ board structures. This paper’s empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative market reactions. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.