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A Study on the Co‐Opetition Game Between Low‐Carbon Supply Chains Under Carbon Cap‐and‐Trade Policy
Author(s) -
Li Fang,
Yang Yijing,
Zhang Wenmin,
Li Jiajia
Publication year - 2025
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.4505
Subject(s) - supply chain , business , carbon fibers , international economics , industrial organization , economics , international trade , computer science , marketing , algorithm , composite number
ABSTRACT Two competing low‐carbon supply chains are modeled using a Nash game and a manufacturer‐dominated Stackelberg game. This study explores equilibrium decisions and profit changes under six competitive models within a carbon cap‐and‐trade policy, focusing on low‐carbon competition and cost reduction. The results indicate that although carbon quotas provide economic benefits, they do not drive emission reductions. Higher carbon trading prices incentivize reductions. Vertical cooperation and horizontal competition improve emission rates and reduce retail prices, whereas horizontal cooperation can harm profits. Optimal outcomes require enhanced collaboration within supply chains and government regulation of carbon trading prices to balance emissions reductions and profits.