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Auctioning divisible goods: does every bidder need to win to achieve an equilibrium price ?
Author(s) -
Raphaële Préget
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
hal (le centre pour la communication scientifique directe)
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
Subject(s) - bidding , common value auction , microeconomics , mathematical economics , english auction , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , economics , auction theory , vickrey auction , unique bid auction

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