Skinner and Merleau-Ponty’s Criticism of Causality

A strong connection between explaining phenomena and identifying causes is commonly observed not only in philosophical, but also in scientifi c and common sense discourse. Nonetheless, critical analyses conducted in philosophy of science, especially as of the twentieth century, questioned this tacit connection, to the effect that a scientifi c explanation does not necessarily imply identifying causes. Examples of this viewpoint applied to discussions of psychological phenomena can be found in various traditions, such as M. Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenology and B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism. The present paper seeks to highlight the criticism of causal theories, discussing the fundamental contribution of such criticism to treating behavior as a phenomenon with its own sense, as was proposed in MerleauPonty and Skinner’s approaches . Both approaches claim that explaining behavior does not signify identifying causes, but rather describing either the structure of behavior, according to Merleau-Ponty, or the contingencies of reinforcement, according to Skinner. Along these lines, we recommend such criticism as an element favoring potential closeness and dialogue between these different perspectives.