Open AccessGeneralized Nash Equilibria of Nonmonetized Noncooperative Games on Lattices
Author(s) -
Jinlu Li
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
british journal of economics management and trade
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2278-098X
DOI - 10.9734/bjemt/2014/4618
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , mathematical economics , epsilon equilibrium , folk theorem , mathematics , best response , correlated equilibrium , fixed point theorem , risk dominance , game theory , equilibrium selection , repeated game , discrete mathematics
In this paper, we examine noncooperative games with both of the collection of strategies and the ranges of the utilities for the players are lattices, which are said to be nonmonetized. Then we extend the concept of Nash equilibria of noncooperative games to generalized Nash equilibria of nonmonetized noncooperative games. By applying some fixed point theorems in posets and by using the order preserving property of mappings, we prove an existence theorem of generalized Nash equilibria for nonmonetized noncooperative games.
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