Currently Persisting Paradoxes: Getting Clear about Endurantism

This paper addresses a mereological paradox which faces proponents of endurantism, the theory of persistence according to which objects may be wholly located at several times. The paradox is intended to demonstrate that endurantism is false because it entails that enduring objects are both 3D and 4D. I offer three ways for the endurantist to avoid the paradoxical conclusion by demonstrating that the fusion principle required to generate the paradox is untenable. One central thesis championed by many endurantists is what has been called multilocation. An object is multi-located if it exists at two or more distinct space-times. Very roughly, endurantists believe that a persisting object is multi-located at each of the times during which it exists. Just as we can imagine an object existing at more than one place at one time, so we can conceive of an object existing "wholly" at multiple times. If this thesis were undermined, it would be a significant and possibly fatal blow to the endurantist's theory. Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe present a series of related paradoxes which, based largely on mereological notions, supposedly cause a lot of problems for the endurantist thesis of multi-location. I will show that these paradoxes fail to be troubling for the endurantist because it is open to the endurantist to question the legitimacy of the mereological fusion required to generate them. Although Barker and Dowe present several paradoxes, they are all very similar and, as far as I can tell, rely upon the same mistaken fusion principle. I will, therefore, only address the central mereological paradox. The paradox is formulated in a way which assumes eternalism about space-time, but this is no serious concern since many 1 See for example (McCall & Lowe, 2006) 2 (Barker & Dowe, Paradoxes of Multi-Location, 2003), (Barker & Dowe, Endurance Is Paradoxical, 2005) Res Cogitans (2014) 5 Jarrott | 7