Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study

This article tests two inter-related theories on the situational causes of violence in illicit drug markets: (i) drug markets that are unstable are more prone to violence and (ii) there is a higher risk of instability, and hence conflict and violence, in drug markets characterized by pure competition. These theories are applied to the violence that occurred between the Hell’s Angels and its rivals over dominance in Quebec’s lucrative cocaine market during the 1990s. The theory that violence stems from instability in an illicit market is applicable to this case study. However, Quebec’s cocaine market was characterized by oligopolistic conditions and the ensuing violence stemmed from the Hell’s Angels’ efforts to maintain hegemony in that market. This paper argues that oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions in illicit drug markets may heighten the risk of conflict and violence because such conditions inhibit competition.