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El pensamiento iusracionalista en el que se basa el reconocimiento de los derechos constitucionales en la Constitucion de 1812 entraba en conflicto con el concepto rousseauniano de la ley, expresado en el art. 4 CE. En efecto, desde una optica iusracional parece que no se les debia aplicar a las leyes que debieran «conservar» los derechos individuales, como al resto de leyes, el mero criterio de conveniencia o utilidad para el bien publico en funcion de cual sea la voluntad general, sino que se antepone al legislador el contenido irreductible e indisponible de cada derecho. Al mismo tiempo, la ley en cuanto tal no podia ser injusta desde el punto de vista de su legitimidad, ya que ni en cuanto a su origen —al proceder de un consentimiento pactado—, ni en cuanto a su naturaleza —porque es todo el pueblo quien decreta sobre si mismo—, podia decirse que una ley sea injusta, «puesto que nadie es injusto con respecto a si mismo». Si la ley se presentaba como norma cuyos mandatos y prohibiciones son justos, dados sus atributos formales, procedimentales y materiales ?que sentido pudo tener exigir ademas que las leyes habian de ser sabias y justas? La respuesta es que frente al subjetivismo del voluntarismo contractualista ligado al concepto rousseauniano de ley, se alzaba el positivismo racionalista de una Constitucion rigida. Esta oposicion es la que trataba de resolver el art. 4 de la Constitucion tratando de conciliar lo debido segun la justicia moral y lo provechoso segun lo conveniente o util, lo que trataba de ventilar el art. 4 CE. Ius-rational thinking on which is based the recognition of constitutional rights in the Constitution of 1812 conflicted with Rousseau’s concept of law, expressed in art. 4 of Cadiz Constitution. Indeed, from the ius-rational standpoint, were not applicable to laws that should «preserve» the rights of individuals, the validity criterion of convenience or utility for the public good according to general will, as all other laws, but the unavailable and irreducible content of each right prefixed to legislator. At the same time, the law, as such, could not be unfair from the point of view of legitimacy, since neither in its origin —coming from a stipulated consent— either in its nature —because is all the people who enacted on themselves—, it could not be said that a law could be unjust, «since no one is wrong about himself.» If the law was presented as a norm which commands and prohibitions are fair, given their formal, procedural and material attributes, what sense might have to require in addition that the laws had to be wise and just? The answer is that against the subjectivism of Rousseau’s voluntarist contractualism linked to the concept of law, stood the rationalist positivism of a rigid constitution. This opposition is what article 4 of Cadiz Constitution was trying to solve, by means of try conciliation between what is due according to moral justice and what is good as convenient or useful.

Garantía moral vs garantía normativa de los derechosEn la Constitución de Cádiz y su protección mediante leyes sabias y justas