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O naturalismo biológico em John Searle: A objetividade epistêmica e a subjetividade ontológica como artífices da consciência
Author(s) -
Edimar Brígido,
Fátima Szinwelski,
Felipe Daniel do Lago Godoi
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
endoxa
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2174-5676
pISSN - 1133-5351
DOI - 10.5944/endoxa.46.2020.26065
Subject(s) - subjectivity , epistemology , conscience , philosophy , naturalism , materialism , objectivity (philosophy) , consciousness , philosophy of mind , physicalism , metaphysics
Or present article salient to the theme of consciousness, as a crucial fator we are mindful, based on a historical retake, encompassing the principalities that justify and conceive this phenomenon. Initially, discussed in the "mind-brain" problem, a conscience is given to the leading role of Philosophy of Mind, alicerçada em duas great corntes: monista and dualista. Both, theoretically, from the ramifications of Cartesian thought, which divides the mind and mind into these dichotomous substances or as reduced to pure materialism, discarding subjectivities. Searle, based on his Biological Naturalism, stands out as an innovative thinker, who unleashes the current theories, proposed to analyze two states as a result of epistemic objectivity together with no ontological subjectivity. 

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